Nigeria's Campaign Season: Four Parts of a Whole

The start of Nigeria's campaign season for the presidential election in 1979 was full of drama. Michael Ani, then chairman of the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), began the season by announcing that two out of five presidential candidates were disqualified. Nnamdi Azikiwe from the Nigerian Peoples’ Party (NPP) and Aminu Kano from the People’s Redemption Party (PRP) were disqualified due to issues with their tax returns. Ani said they “are not fit to run the country.”

While other party candidates campaigned, Azikiwe and Kano took their case to court to fight for their eligibility. The court ruled in favor of Azikiwe just before the election date, in late July 1979, with only three weeks left until the vote on 11 August. Kano got the green light to run on 1 August 1979, just 10 days before the election.

The uncertainty about their candidacies nearly dashed the hopes of both Azikiwe and Kano in 1979. This situation showed that courts have a big role in shaping the political landscape in Nigeria.

As Nigeria gears up for another presidential campaign season, the nature of political campaigns and the role of the judiciary has changed a lot since 1979. The digital space has become an important venue for political campaigns. For the first time, Artificial Intelligence will also play a role in the upcoming 2026/27 campaign season.

Despite these changes, the biggest shift in Nigerian political campaigns in nearly five decades is how the judiciary has become a key player in politics. Democracy should be about the choices of the people. But in Nigeria, citizens often end up as spectators. They do not decide who wins or loses. Judges have the final say. Politicians who do not pay attention to the courts find it hard to gain power.

In the past, each election had two parts: pre-election and post-election. But in 2007, the Supreme Court changed this approach. During the party primaries for the Rivers State governorship election that year, Rotimi Amaechi won. However, the party leaders in Abuja, led by President Olusegun Obasanjo, ignored this and replaced him with Celestine Omehia, who had lost.

Amaechi took the matter to court on 26 January 2007. While he waited for the court's decision, the country held its elections. When the votes were counted, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) declared Omehia the winner of the Rivers State governorship election. He was sworn in as governor on 29 May 2007.

Almost five months later, on 25 October 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that the PDP acted wrongly by replacing Amaechi with someone he had defeated. The court stated that when people vote, they vote for parties, not just candidates. Since Amaechi was the rightful candidate for the PDP, he was entitled to the victory that went to Omehia.

The court made Amaechi the elected governor even though he was not on the ballot due to circumstances beyond his control. This ruling changed the game. It blurred the lines between pre-election and post-election periods. The previous distinction served three main functions.

First, it helped candidates and INEC plan their resources, budgets, and messages for the election season. Second, pre-election disputes went to the regular courts, while only election tribunals could handle post-election disputes. This was a key difference. A single judge could rule on a pre-election issue, but an election petition tribunal needed at least three judges working within strict timelines.

Third, pre-election disputes did not affect the election outcome. They only determined if candidates could be on the ballot. In contrast, post-election matters directly influenced who won the elections. Only election petition tribunals could decide on that.

The Amaechi case changed this by allowing courts to weigh in on election outcomes. For example, in 2019, the Supreme Court ruled long after voting that it would discard the votes for the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) and award victory in Zamfara State to candidates rejected by the people. In 2023, the Court of Appeal did something similar in Plateau State. The Supreme Court had to step in to save the governor's position.

Since the Amaechi case in 2007, the courts have turned the political season into an ongoing challenge that ends not with voting, but in courtrooms. This shift has forced politicians to rethink their strategies regarding campaign staffing, funding, and approaches.

Serious politicians now understand that it is not enough to have their people in INEC and the security agencies. They also need allies in the judiciary. Judicial appointments have become a big deal, often left to politicians and their judicial associates. Politicians realize they must be involved when important judicial votes are decided.

This situation means that the political campaign season never really ends. Politicians know they must maintain good relations with the judiciary. Senior politicians compete to make large donations to judges, offering cars, houses, hospital bills, and even money for school fees abroad.

Everyone understands that the final decision on election winners and losers is made through negotiations with judges. Niger State Governor, Mohammed Bago, reportedly gave out over 100 vehicles to judges in one event. Every state governor competes in this arena of judicial generosity. FCT Minister, Nyesom Wike, is seen as Nigeria’s top supporter of the judiciary.

It is no surprise that as INEC kicked off its campaign season late last month, the judiciary was on its annual break. They will have another vacation at the end of the year.

Now, each election cycle in Nigeria feels like a continuous campaign season divided into four parts. There is one part focused on political charity for the judiciary. This cycle can seem unending. The party-political campaign season is brief but important. That period mainly involves the parties, politicians, and their backers, while many judges keep an eye on things.

The voting season is short. It is when security agencies and lower-level INEC staff take charge. After that, it shifts to the courts for dispute resolution, which involves lawyers, especially Senior Advocates of Nigeria (SANs), and judges. All four parts are separate but rely on each other.